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The paper examines the determinants of voluntary International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
adoption in Poland. In doing so, it empirically confirms the impact of diverse CEO and supervisory board 
characteristics on voluntary IFRS adoption. The paper focuses on  446 publicly traded production companies from 
Poland. The analysis is based on logistic regression analysis. The empirical investigation  confirms the impact on 
voluntary IFRS adoption of such factors as company size, international investors, international supervisory board, 
number of supervisory board members, CEO nationality. The paper  contributes to the assessment of  voluntary 
IFRS adoption determinants, by presenting for the first time CEO and supervisory board characteristics and their 
impact on voluntary International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption, and the determinants of IFRS 
adoption from Central and Eastern Europe. The paper enhances  existing knowledge of voluntary IFRS adoption 
by incorporating  new CEO and supervisory board characteristics, thus closing a gap in the relevant literature. 
The results of the paper are significant from the supervisor’s perspective, the quality of financial statements and 
the effectiveness of corporate governance systems. 
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1. Introduction 
 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
are the most widely employed  accounting standards. 
In some countries, non-consolidated financial 
statements have to  be prepared according to IFRS (e.g. 
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) in others it is forbidden (e.g. Hungary). In 
Poland, the preparation of  non-consolidated 
statements in accordance  to IFRS takes  place on a 
voluntary basis.  
IFRS-based financial statements increase their 
comparability, mitigate investors’ risk as well as 
information risk (Parlakkaya et al., 2011; Houqe et al., 
2016). Voluntary IFRS adoption increases the quality 
of public disclosures (Bassemir and Novotny‐Farkas, 
2018), reducing the significance of private information 
Arsen et al., 2010). There is a positive capital markets’ 
reaction and increased value relevance of accounting 
information from an investor perspective after IFRS 
adoption (Kouki, 2018, Petera et al., 2019). Previous 
studies reported that IFRS adoption have a greater 
impact on the quality of financial statements in 
countries with less advanced accounting systems 
(Hope et al., 2006; Rehman et al., 2014), IFRS also 
reduce the earnings management practices (Yang and 
Abeysekera, 2018.) 
It was claimed that IFRS adoption in countries with 
less advanced accounting systems, like Poland may 
enhance the reliability and quality of financial 
reporting (Borowski and Kariozen 2007; Waniak-
Michalak et al, 2012). IFRS increase the comparability 
and application  of financial statements (Kędzior and 
Grabiński, 2018). Up to now, research on voluntary 
IFRS adoption have focused on West European 
countries (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; André et 
al., 2012; Pichler et al., 2018). There are also studies 
on the factors influencing  IFRS use in emerging 
countries (Graham et al., 2017). However, there are no 
contributions verifying the determinants of voluntary 
IFRS adoption in Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. Researchers focused on the determinants of 
voluntary IFRS adoption at a company level 
(Bassemir, 2018; André et al., 2012), at a country level 
(Hope et al., 2006; Pais and Bonito, 2018, Damak-
Ayadi et al., 2020; Salem et al., 2017; Zahid and 
Simga-Mugan, 2019), and both  at a company and 
country level mostly in high developed countries. The 
literature does not  cover the different CEO and 
supervisory board characteristics, which could have a 
potential impact on voluntary IFRS adoption.  
The purpose of this research is to identify the 
factors facilitating identification of IFRS, in terms of  
CEO and supervisory board characteristics in Polish 
companies. 
The structure of the study is as follows. Section 2 
presents the most significant research studies on the 
determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption. Section 3 
discusses the applied research methodology involved a 
three-stage approach model to assess the impact and 
significance of identified determinants on IFRS 
adoption. Section 4 presents the results of empirical 
research. The article is completed by presenting the 
conclusions and references. 
The paper’s contribution is twofold:  (i)  it 
introduces the CEO and supervisory board 
characteristics that determine the use of high-quality 
accounting standards such as IFRS, (ii) it presents 
international corporate governance mechanisms which 
affect voluntary IFRS adoption. 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses development 
 
 Stakeholder oriented corporate governance systems 
are applied in Polish companies (Collier and Zaman, 
2005). The first level of corporate governance is 
management, which apart from operating activities, is 
responsible for creating an accounting system with a 
specific role assigned to CEOs. CEOs not only sign 
financial statements, but are also responsible for 
company account plans and accounting policies. 
Supervisory boards, on the other hand, are responsible 
for a wide range of supervisory activities including the 
oversight of financial reporting.  
The actual impact of company management on 
various aspects of financial reporting have been widely 
studied. A business entity’s management frequently 
affects accounting policies in a conscious way. 
Managers often resort to accounting policies to signal 
future cash flows or to decrease the probability of debt 
covenant violation (Young, 1998). Accounting policies 
are also used to justify management’s high bonuses 
(Inoue and Wayne, 1996). It should be noted that 
accounting policies can be used both to increase and 
decrease company earnings (Astami and Tower, 2006; 
Lo et al., 2017). choices made in the process of 
accounting valuations at fair value increase the ability 
to manage profits in time, or even manipulate them  
(Barth and Taylor, 2010). When managers apply the 
concept of fair value, measurements in accounting do 
not always meet neutrality criteria (Baluch et al., 2011; 
Khurana and Kim, 2003), especially when a business 
entity applies earnings management (Salvary, 2006). 
Managers are actively engaged in exerting influence on 
the quality and quantity of disclosures. It should be 
noted that some executives “manage” the volumes of 
disclosed financial information (Choi and Meek, 2005; 
Nobes and Stadler, 2015). Lang and Lundholm (2000) 
found out that the range of disclosed information is 
wider when a publicly traded company intends to sell a 
package of shares in capital markets. According to 
Broberg et al. (2010), companies with high levels of 
management ownership disclose less information than 
other entities. In contrast to managers, a supervisory 
board is mainly engaged in monitoring the process of 
financial reporting (Pathak and Sun, 2013; Cho and 
Rui, 2009; Anderson et al., 2004; Leuz and 
Wüstemann, 2003). The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board as well as the world’s major stock exchanges 
continuously stress the significance of supervisory 
boards in overseeing the activities of business entities 
(Anderson et al., 2004). This process includes the 
oversight of alternative accounting solutions, 
accounting policies with regard to disclosures, internal 
control processes and the selections of independent 
auditors. Vafeas (2000) shares the same view on the 
basic role of supervisory boards. Supervisory boards 
are responsible for assuring the quality of information 
presented in financial reports. According to Yang et al. 
(2011), a supervisory board’s main objective is to 
monitor managers’ behaviour, overview and audit 
financial statements submitted by directors, oversee 
company assets as well as assess and monitor the 
finances of business entities. Cho and Rui (2009) 
believe that a supervisory board should make sure that 
an entity’s financial and operational condition is 
presented accurately, fairly and completely. The 
effectiveness of control mechanisms relies heavily on 
the independence of supervisory boards (Pathak and 
Sun, 2013). Well-functioning supervisory boards 
reduce information asymmetry (Ilieva et al., 2018). 
The quality of supervision is generally improved if it is 
exercised by women and persons with academic 
experience (Ran et al., 2015). As the CEO and 
supervisory board may be conditioned by the size and 
the way of organizing the company, we included into 
our analysis also company size and investor 
characteristics, in terms of nationality.    
 
2.1. Company size 
Larger companies incur lower information production 
costs as well as lower costs of competitive 
disadvantage associated with their disclosures (André 
et al., 2012), hence they find it easier to meet stricter 
requirements related to disclosures according to IFRS. 
The necessity of a greater number of disclosures results 
from the fact that large companies acquire financing 
from foreign capital markets. Therefore, IFRS 
adoption can be treated as a component of corporate 
governance, which is significant in the case of external 
financing, especially for big companies (Francis et al., 
2008a). In addition, high political costs in large 
companies support the use of IFRS (Matonti and 
Iuliano, 2012). Bassemir (2018) notes that big firms 
usually sell more products abroad and have more 
overseas subsidiaries, which increases information 
requirements as well as agency costs. Hence, a greater 
number of disclosures and IFRS adoption is more 
possible (Tarca, 2004). Larger companies also possess  
the necessary financial resources needed to implement 
IFRS (Pichler et al., 2018). Thus, it is hypothesized 
that: 
H1: Larger companies are more frequently inclined 
to voluntarily adopt IFRS than smaller entities.   
 
2.2. International investor 
According to the International Accounting Standard 
Board (IASB), globally harmonised accounting 
standards have a positive impact on decreasing 
information asymmetry between national and 
international participants of capital markets, especially 
in emerging markets (Bova, 2007). Covrig et al. (2007) 
noted that companies, which voluntarily adopt IFRS, 
have a greater potential to attract foreign investors. 
They disclose more information, which is presented 
according to widely used standards. 
According to Bagaev (2006), emerging markets can 
face the problem of the lack of foreign investment due 
to limited confidence in the quality of disclosures. 
Therefore, investors frequently require local 
businesses to adopt IFRS or US GAAP. Foreign 
shareholders particularly insist on using IFRS if their 
shareholding is dispersed (Pichler et al., 2018). They 
also  rely heavily on high-quality, global accounting 
standards that are familiar with  and understand as 
opposed to local standards (Matonti and Iuliano, 2012). 
This phenomenon is intensified if the foreign parent 
company also uses IFRS. Klai and Omri (2013) stress 
that foreign investors have a positive impact on the 
quality of accounting in emerging markets as well as 
on earnings quality and transparency. Firth et al. (2007) 
confirm investors’ impact on the earnings response 
coefficients and discretionary accruals and provide 
empirical evidence confirming a positive correlation 
between earnings quality and foreign shareholding. On 
the other hand, An and Naughton (2007) provide 
empirical evidence confirming a positive correlation 
between foreign investor share ownership and the 
conservatism of financial reporting. Therefore, they 
will strive to improve the quality of accounting in local 
markets, so the likelihood of using IFRS increases 
Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
H2: Companies with international ownership are 
more supportive of IFRS adoption 
 
2.3. Number of supervisory board members 
According to Chiraz and Anis (2012), there is a 
correlation between board size and earnings 
management. Larger boards are often composed of 
experienced financial experts. According to Bouchareb 
et al. (2014), large boards have the ability to monitor 
earnings management, and their experienced 
administrators are capable of reducing its impact. 
Similar results were obtained by Abbadi et al. (2016). 
Research conducted by Karagul and Yonet (2012), 
show that the scope of voluntary disclosures is 
positively correlated with the size of the board and the 
number of its independent members (Karagul and 
Yonet, 2012). According to Upadhyay and Sriram 
(2011), the supervisory board size has a positive effect 
on the transparency of information reported by the 
entity. On the other hand empirical research indicates 
that small supervisory boards contribute to increasing 
the informativeness of earnings (Vafeas, 2000). 
Attention should be drawn  to correlation between the 
scope of voluntary disclosures and supervisory board 
size. Generally, larger supervisory boards have a 
positive impact on accounting quality and will 
therefore be more likely to voluntarily apply high-
quality accounting standards such as IFRS. Thus, it  is 
hypothesized that: 
H3: The scope of IFRS application is broader for 
companies with numerous supervisory board 
members.  
 
2.4. International supervisory board  
Palmer and Varner (2007) identified a growing number 
of international supervisory boards in European 
business entities. This trend may prevail as a result of 
the increasing volumes of sales in overseas markets 
(Davarcioglu, 2011). Foreign supervisory board 
members (foreign external directors) should be treated 
in a similar manner to foreign CEOs. Generally, they 
are more independent in terms of their connections 
with the network of local contacts. External board 
members reflect the extent to which boards can retain 
their independence in monitoring issues related to 
financial reporting (Pathak and  Sun, 2013; Cho and 
Rui, 2009). External independent directors are not 
familiar with local accounting and governance 
standards, which can hinder the process of supervision 
and assessments of business entities (Masulis et al., 
2010). It can encourage the application of widely used 
and accepted standards, e.g. IFRS. Often, companies 
that have international stakeholders also have 
international supervisory boards, which require more 
standardized financial statements, e.g. IFRS (Pichler et 
al., 2018). Greater practical knowledge of IFRS among 
foreign board members increases their acceptance 
(Damak-Ayadi et al., 2020).Thus, it is hypothesized 
that: 
H4: Supervisory boards composed of members from 
different countries are more likely to voluntarily 
adopt IFRS.   
 
2.5. CEO nationality  
In big European entities, a CEO usually comes from 
the country where the company has its headquarters 
(Weber, 2010). They are often regarded to be highly 
educated business leaders. Foreign CEOs, then, can be 
regarded as independent decision-makers (Ruigrok et 
al., 2007). Foreign CEOs have even more 
independence than their counterparts who are outside 
members but come from the same country. In most 
cases, they are appointed as CEOs, but do not act as 
board chairpersons. 
Chang and Sun (2009), Klai and Omri (2013) stress 
negative correlations between CEO duality and the 
likelihood of non-compliance with accounting 
standards and lower financial reporting quality. The 
positive impact of the company's most senior  
managers from abroad on reducing the scale of 
earnings management and accounting quality has also 
been confirmed by Du et al. (2017). Therefore, it can 
be assumed that foreign CEOs will make independent 
choices with regard to accounting standards and will 
improve accounting quality, or will even prefer the 
widely known standards to the local ones. Duan et al. 
(2019) noted, in turn, that CEO with experience 
acquired abroad rely more on models, solutions, global 
standards (e.g. IFRS) in relation to local practices. 
Thus, it  is hypothesized that: 
H5: Foreign CEOs are more determined to adopt 
IFRS.  
 
2.6. CEO’s academic degree 
Education has a positive effect on disclosure 
quality in business entities (Reeb and Zhao, 2013). On 
the other hand, academic knowledge about the 
diversity of accounting in individual countries prevails 
in theory rather than practice (Conesa and Martinez, 
2004). Bancel and Mittoo (2004) observed that the vast 
majority of CEOs in European listed companies have 
university degrees (above 70%), whereas 40% hold 
MBA certificates. It cannot be expected that a large 
group of CEOs will have academic titles (Reeb and 
Zhao, 2013; Graham et al., 2005). Adebayo and 
Sharma (2017) believe that the introduction of IFRS-
related issues to academic curricula increases their 
acceptability in business practice. Lack of proper 
education, including academic education, hinders the 
introduction of IFRS (Siregar et al., 2017). It is  
hypothesized that: 
H6: CEOs with academic degrees (PhD) are more 
likely to voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
 
2.7. CEO gender 
Women are more cautious in making various 
financial decisions and are more likely to act in 
compliance with rules and regulations. Also, they are 
more compliant in tax-reporting decisions than men 
(Barua et al, 2010). Musteen et al. (2006) investigated 
the acceptance of change among both male and female 
CEOs acting as managing directors. They found that 
women present a more liberal attitude to organisational 
changes than men do, when holding key positions in 
organisations. Ruigrok et al. (2007) stress that females 
who perform key functions in business entities are 
more independent. As compared with males, they less 
frequently hold simultaneous key positions in other 
businesses. Thus, they are likely to make more 
independent choices with regard to accounting 
standards. In general, women in managerial positions 
generally have a positive impact on accounting quality 
(Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2017). Hence they are more 
likely to be willing to introduce high-quality 
accounting standards such as IFRS. Thus, it is  
hypothesized that: 
H7: Entities managed by female CEOs are more 
likely to voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
 
2.8. CEO age  
Age - to a significant extent - determines the 
acceptance of change in organisations (McClelland et 
al., 2010). It should be noted that senior managers are 
less likely to accept higher business risk with age 
(McClelland and O’Brien, 2011). According to Lin et 
al (2014), age has an impact on the accepted level of 
risk. Senior managers are less inclined to take a risk 
and tend to make more conservative decisions. They 
are less interested in significant, difficult and time-
consuming changes in financial reporting, such as the 
introduction of IFRS. 
Huang et al. (2012) investigated the relationship 
between the quality of financial reporting and CEO 
age. The findings suggest that there is a positive 
correlation between the age of CEOs and the quality of 
financial reporting. On the other hand, older and long-
serving employees may significantly influence their 
colleagues, to the detriment of financial reporting 
(Hunton et al., 2011). Davidson et al. (2007) note that 
people nearing retirement age may generate higher 
agency costs (the so-called horizon problem). CEO 
nearing retirement age may no longer cares about the 
accounting quality, being concerned with current rather 
than future gains. Thus, it is  hypothesized that: 
H8: With older CEOs, entities are less likely to 
voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
 
2.9. CEO ownership  
On the basis of studies conducted in Western Europe it 
can be concluded that executive ownership usually 
does not exceed 5% of share capital (ca. 85% of cases), 
hence CEOs have relatively limited share ownership in 
listed companies, and in most cases they are minority 
shareholders (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004). 
However, empirical research does not confirm a 
positive impact of CEO ownership on the quality of 
accounting (Yasser et al., 2017). According to 
Machuga and Teitel (2009), there is a negative 
correlation between earnings quality understood as 
income smoothing, timely loss recognition and 
conditional accruals and CEO ownership. When 
managers hold less than 25% of shares, managerial 
opportunism decreases. However, when ownership 
exceeds 25%, managers are more likely to apply 
aggressive income-increasing discretionary accruals. 
Eng and Mak (2003) found that the low level of 
managerial ownership has a positive impact on 
increased disclosures. It should be noted that investors 
themselves do not find correlations between 
managerial ownership and earnings high predictive 
value (al-Dhamari and Ismail, 2013). In view of the 
above, managers who own shares in the company do 
not support a higher accounting quality and they will 
also not be willing to apply the IFRS if their 
shareholding in the company will be significant. Thus, 
H9: CEO with share ownership in the entity is less 
supportive of IFRS adoption.  
 
3. Material and Methods  
 
 
The study methodology involved a three-stage 
approach: (i) identification of variables that may 
influence the adoption of IFRS (ii) investigation of the 
correlation between identified variables (iii) estimation 
a logit model to assess the impact and significance of 
previously identified determinants on IFRS adoption.  
The research focused on manufacturing 
companies under US SIC 1000 – US SIC 3999 
classification. According to other studies, the 
production sector applies IFRS more frequently than 
other industries (Wu and Zhang, 2009). This sector is 
characterised by higher debt levels, so production 
companies may need IFRS to monitor agency conflicts 
between investors and lenders (Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 1998). Companies from this sector have 
more freedom in implementing independent financial 
policies than financial or service businesses. The 
production sector is characterised by similar core 
operational activities, production cycles as well as 
similar financial categories (Kędzior, 2012). 
Production is the largest sector in Poland in terms of 
the number of businesses, hence the results of the 
analysis can apply to all Polish business entities. 
We examined the companies listed in the Polish 
market in 2016. The analysis covered 445 companies, 
61% of the total. The data was collected from the Orbis 
database and companies websites.  
Company size, presence of international investor, 
supervisory board characteristics and CEO 
characteristics were considered as the possible factors 
that may influence adoption of IFRS. Company size is 
measured by operating revenues (Euro); this variable is 
defined in a similar way by André et al. (2012), and 
Bessieux-Ollier and Walliser (2012). Supervisory 
board characteristics was analysed in terms of presence 
of international board and size. A similar approach to 
measure the supervisory board in terms of nationality 
was presented by Masulis et al. (2010); Klai and Omri 
(2013). Supervisory board size – was measured as the 
number of board members. The identical approach was 
presented by Chiraz and Anis (2012), Vafeas, 2000; 
Karagul and Yonet (2012). CEO was analysed in terms 
of nationality, education, gender, age, share ownership. 
CEO nationality was analysed in terms of the country 
of origin of the entity and academic degree in terms of 
holding a PhD degree. A similar approach was adopted  
by Anderson et al., 2004; Bradbury et al. (2006); 
Karagul and Yonet (2012).  
 The correlation between the identified variables 
was estimated. Following that, a logit model was 
specified and estimated in order to assess the impact 
and significance of identified determinants on IFRS 
adoption. The logit model was used by a number of 
authors in similar research studies: André et al. (2012); 
Bessieux-Ollier and Walliser (2012); Bassemir (2018); 
Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), and Wu and Zhang 
(2009).  
 
The model is specified as follows: 
 
logit (Probability of IFRS ) = β0 + β1(Company size) 
+ β2(International investors) +β3(Supervisory board 
size) + β4(International supervisory board)  + 
β5(CEO nationality) + β6(CEO academic degree) + 
β7(CEO gender) + β8(CEO age) + β9(CEO 
ownership) + e 
 
Data is shown with means, standard deviations, 
medians and interquartile ranges, differences were 
calculated with Mann-Whitney test and Wilocoxon 
signed-rank test. A p-value of less than 0.05 was 
considered statistically significant. We used 
STATISTICA, Statsoft (2011), version 13.3. 
 
4. Results 
 
Across the firms in our sample (445) the average 
operating revenues is 8,579,000 € (table 1). Moreover, 
38,65% of the sample firms have operating revenues 
lower than 1,000,000 € and 20,45% higher than 
10,000,000 €. The number of persons in supervisory 
board is on average 2.57 and in 79,55% of the sample 
firms is less than 4 persons.  
Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample firms 
 
Variables Mean (SD); Median [Q1 – Q3] 
Company size (thousand €) COMPS  8,579 (31,826); 1,346 [345;5,019]  
Supervisory board size (person) SUPBOS 2.57 (2.66);  1.00 [1.00;3.00] 
CEO age (years) CEOA 52.0 (13.3) ; 53.0 [42.0;63.0] 
                                             n (%) 
Company size (thousand €) COMPSR  
<1,000  172 (38,65) 
1,000-10,000  180 (40,45) 
>10,000  91 (20,45) 
CEO age (years) CEOAG  
<40  98 (20,02) 
41-60  219 (49,21) 
>60  128 (28,76) 
Board size (person) SUPBOSR  
<4  172 (38,65) 
4-10  65 (14,61) 
>10  23 (5,84) 
International investor ININW  
No    311 (84.50)    
Yes     57 (15.50)    
International supervisory board INTSUP  
No    335 (91.0)    
Yes     33 (8.97)    
CEO nationality CEON  
national    358 (97.3)    
foreign     10 (2.72)    
CEO academic degree CEOAD  
Without  Ph.D.    356 (96.70)    
With Ph. D.     12 (3.26)    
CEO gender CEOG  
Male    336 (91.30)    
Female     32 (8.70)    
CEO ownership CEOWN  
not shareholder    227 (61.70)    
shareholder    141 (38.30)    
COMPS = company size; COMPSR = company size (ranges);  CEOAG = CEO age; SUPBOS = Board size; SUPBOSR = Board size 
(ranges); ININW = International investor; INTSUP = International supervisory board; CEON = CEO nationality; 
CEOAD = CEO academic degree; CEOG = CEO gender; CEOWN = CEO ownership 
Source: own research 
 
CEOs have an average age of 52 years, and 
almost 50% of them is 41-60 years old. There are no 
international investors and international supervisory 
board in 84.50% and 91% of the sample firms, 
respectively. The statistics show that 97.30% CEOs 
are Polish and 3.26% of CEOs have a PhD. The 
findings reveal  that female CEOs lead only 32 of the 
sample firms (8.70%). In 141 companies, CEO holds 
the firm’s shares.  
Our study revealed that IFRS adopted 77 
companies (17,30%) (table 2). Firms, which adopt 
IFRS voluntarily are bigger than entities applying 
local accounting standards. We found statistically 
significant differences between companies that 
confirmed (IFRS) and not confirmed IFRS adoption 
in terms of supervisory board size, international 
investor presence, international supervisory board 
and CEO nationality. In companies that adopted 
IFRS the supervisory board is thrice as big as in 
nIFRS companies. The average number of people in 
IFRS companies’ supervisory board has on average 
6,30 members, while in nIFRS companies 2,57. In 
almost 40% of IFRS companies and in 15% of nIFRS 
ones we observed the presence of international 
investor. 
Table 2. 
Variable comparison companies that confirmed (IFRS) and not confirmed (nIFRS) International Financial Reporting 
Standards adoption 
 
Variables 
nIFRS 
(n=368) 
IFRS 
(n=77) 
p-value* 
 
Mean (SD) 
Median [Q1 – Q3] 
 
Company size (thousand €) 
8,579 (31,826) 
1,346 [345;5,019]  
169,900 (581,151) 
7,054 [2452;35,360] 
<0.001** 
Supervisory board size (person) 
2.57 (2.66) 
 1.00 [1.00;3.00] 
  6.30 (10.4) 
2.00 [1.00;8.00]  
0.001** 
CEO age (years) 
52.0 (13.3)  
53.0 [42.0;63.0] 
  50.2 (12.6)   
52.0 [41.0;60.0]  
NS 
                                                   n (%) n (%)  
Company size – range (thousand €) 
<1000 160 (43,48) 12 (15,58) 
<0,001* 1000-10000 151 (41,03) 29 (37,66) 
>10000 57 (15,49) 36 (46,75) 
CEO age - range (years) 
<40 82 (22,28) 16 (20,78) 
NS 41-60 177 (48,10) 42 (54,54) 
>60 109 (29,62) 19 (24,67) 
Board size – range (person) 
<4 305 (82,88) 49 (63,64) 
0,004* 4-10 50 (13,59) 15 (19,48) 
>10 13 (3,53) 13 (16,88) 
International investor 
No   311 (84.50)       47 (61.00)     <0.001* 
Yes    57 (15.50)       30 (39.00)     
International supervisory board 
No   335 (91.00)       61 (79.20)     
0.005* 
Yes    33 (8.97)       16 (20.80)     
CEO nationality 
national   358 (97.30)       67 (87.00)     
0.001* 
foreign    10 (2.72)       10 (13.00)     
CEO academic degree   
NS Without  Ph.D.   356 (96.70)       75 (97.40)     
With Ph. D.    12 (3.26)        2 (2.60)     
CEO gender   
NS Male   336 (91.30)       71 (92.20)     
Female    32 (8.70)        6 (7.79)     
CEO ownership 
not shareholder   227 (61.70)       53 (68.80)     
NS 
shareholder   141 (38.30)       24 (31.20)     
* Statistical significance calculated with Mann-Whitney test. 
** Statistical significance calculated with Pearson’s χ2 
Source: own research  
 
The International supervisory board was found twice 
more often in IFRS companies than in the others. 
Before employing the regression estimation, we 
investigated the correlation between independent 
variables. Table 3 presents correlations between the 
analysed variables. 
A positive impact of company size and supervisory 
board on voluntary IFRS adoption is confirmed with 
the impact of company size being more significant. As 
expected, there is a positive correlation between 
company size and supervisory board size.  
In conclusion, it can be legitimately  assumed that 
significant factors include: international investor, CEO 
nationality, international supervisory board, company 
size, and supervisory board size. 
To analyze the factors affecting voluntary IFRS 
adoption we used the binary logit regression model. 
The dependent variable (IFRS adoption) is a binary 
variable assuming the value 1 (IFRS company) or zero 
(nIFRS company). The logit model, which is based on 
cumulative logistic probability functions, is 
computationally easier to use and has the advantage to 
predict the probability of IFRS adoption in company. 
The results are presented in Table 4. A positive impact 
of company size and presence of international investor 
on voluntary IFRS adoption is confirmed by the results. 
Our study did not validate the impact of CEO 
characteristics and supervisory board influence on 
voluntary IFRS adoption.  
 
 
 
.  
Table 3. 
Spearman correlations coefficient between independent variables 
Variable COMPS ININW SUPBOS INTSUP CEON CEOAD CEOG CEOAG CEOWN 
          
COMPS 1         
ININW 0,2308* 1        
SUPBOS 0,5981* 0,3192* 1       
INTSUP 0,3342* 0,3153* 0,4903* 1      
CEON 0,4861* 0,3033* 0,5315* 0,5820* 1     
CEOAD 0,0680 0,0734 0,1559* 0,1422* 0,2716* 1    
CEOG -0,038 0,0012 -0,0239 -0,0047 -0,0663 -0,0550 1   
CEOAG -0,0946** 0,0160 -0,0344 -0,0121 -0,0359 -0,0004 0,0160 1  
CEOWN -0,093** -0,0214* -0,1779* -0,1801* -0,1665* -0,0850** -0,0514 -0,0492 1 
IFRS 0,2446* 0,2239* 0,2756* 0,1427* 0,1875* -0,0144 -0,0122 -0,0500 -0,0556 
COMPS = company size;  CEOAG = CEO age; SUPBOSR = Board size; ININW = International investor; INTSUP = 
International supervisory board; CEON = CEO nationality; CEOAD = CEO academic degree; CEOG = CEO gender; CEOWN 
= CEO ownership; p-values in brackets; * - significant at the 0.01 level; ** - significant at the 0.05 level. 
Source: own research  
 
 
Table 4.  
Logistic regression estimation results for IFRS adoption 
  
Coefficient estimate 
Standard error of coefficient 
estimate 
p-value 
   
Intercept 2.2817 0.9257 0.0137 
COMPS -0.0000 0.0000 0.0351* 
ININW 0.4347 0.1645 0.0082** 
INTSUP -0.0718 0.0489 0.1423 
INTSUP -0.3220 0.2903 0.2674 
CEON -0.1814 0.5133 0.7236 
CEOAD -0.5482 0.5647 0.3316 
CEOG 0.0056 0.2398 0.9813 
CEOAG 0.0084 0.0103 0.4150 
CEOWN 0.0431 0.1469 0.7690 
*,** - significant at the 0.1, 0.01 levels, respectively; COMPS = company size;  CEOAG = CEO age; SUPBOSR = 
Board size; ININW = International investor; INTSUP = International supervisory board; CEON = CEO nationality; CEOAD 
= CEO academic degree; CEOG = CEO gender; CEOWN = CEO ownership; 
Source: own research  
 
5. Discussion 
 
Our study revealed that bigger companies 
more often adopt IFRS. The relationship between a 
company’s size and IFRS adoption was confirmed by 
André et al. (2012), Wu and Zhang (2009) and Tran 
et.al. (2019). We presume this is because large 
businesses frequently rely on external financing in 
foreign markets, and IFRS adoption can reduce the cost 
of capital. IFRS, unlike various local accounting 
standards, facilitate adoption of many alternative 
solutions, which can be employed by large and 
operationally and geographically diversified entities. 
Large companies are equipped with necessary financial 
experts and resources, enabling them to adopt IFRS 
(André et al., 2012). Also, they incur lower information 
production costs and lower costs of competitive 
disadvantage associated with disclosures. They are 
inclined to disclose more information, which does not 
pose the threat of losing competitive advantage. As a 
result, bigger companies are able to meet stricter 
requirements imposed by IFRS (Bessieux-Ollier and 
Walliser, 2012). IFRS adoption in large companies can 
be also positively evaluated by markets as an additional 
indication  of a corporate governance system. 
Moreover, large companies’ reliability and 
transparency are, frequently conditioned by IFRS 
adoption.  
We confirmed the results presented by Covrig 
et al. (2007), who discovered statistically significant 
impact of foreign investors on voluntary IFRS 
adoption. Their study claimed that international 
investors select targets with which they are well 
acquainted, and give preference to companies with 
effective corporate governance systems, which implies 
high quality accounting systems. We presume that 
international investors have sufficient financial, human 
and organizational resources to make the right 
decisions with regard to the quality of accounting 
standards (Gul et al., 2010). On the other hand, DeFond 
et. al. (2019) emphasize that foreign investors’ home 
country institutions affect their reaction to IFRS 
adoption or other activities. For example foreign 
investors from countries with weak legal and economic 
institutions, similar to those in China, are supposed to 
reduce their investment by a greater amount than 
foreign investors from countries with strong 
institutions, like Poland (Popov, 2001). 
A high proportion of supervisory board 
members in companies from Poland come from the 
company’s country of origin. International supervisory 
boards still constitute a relatively insignificant group 
also in West European corporations (van Veen and 
Marsman, 2008). It can be assumed that the number of 
members in international supervisory boards in Polish 
companies will increase due to the economic 
development of individual countries or companies as 
well as intensified international trade. As foreign 
supervisory boards have a positive impact on the 
quality of accounting in emerging markets, we 
presume that replacement of local standards with IFRS 
in less developed markets improves the quality of 
accounting (Klai and Omri, 2013; Firth et al., 2007; An 
and Naughton, 2007).  
The size of a supervisory board is only partially  
statistically significant determinant of voluntary IFRS 
adoption. The results are somewhat surprising because 
the size of a supervisory board usually leads to 
improved transparency of financial information 
(Upadhyay and Sriram, 2011). Larger boards in big 
entities need comprehensive and high quality 
information to perform their supervisory functions, 
hence the likelihood of application of IFRS should be 
higher. On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that 
board size is commonly determined by national law or 
listing requirements and is mostly based on the 
enterprise size and sector (Bezo et.al., 2015). 
Our study verified positively the hypothesis 
claiming the impact of international supervisory boards 
on IFRS adoption, but statistical significance is low. 
However, to some extent international supervisory 
boards may be associated with the expansion of 
international business activity, which leads to broader 
IFRS application (André et al., 2012). It will be 
necessary to develop a business language 
understandable to all supervisory board members 
(Palmer and Varner, 2007). Foreign board members 
can enforce IFRS application – they are better 
acquainted with international standards. Frequently, as 
the representatives of foreign investors, they require 
adoption of accounting standards applied by parent 
companies. It seems that the impact of this factor on 
IFRS adoption – to be more significant – should be 
enhanced by other conditions. 
We  found that a CEO’s nationality determines 
voluntary IFRS adoption, but only in small extent. The 
results seem surprising because foreign CEOs, 
similarly to foreign supervisory board members, 
usually have more confidence in generally accepted 
accounting standards (IFRS). It should be noted that 
the majority of CEOs in the companies come from their 
countries of origin. This phenomenon is typical of 
relatively small entities, with their business activity 
located chiefly in their country of origin. The 
confirmation of this phenomenon can be found in 
Weber’s (2010) research. Indeed, foreign  CEOs are 
significantly more numerous in companies adopting 
IFRS as compared with businesses applying local 
standards. They usually perform managerial, not 
supervisory functions. CEO positions are frequently 
held by business leaders who have broad practical 
knowledge (Ruigrok et al., 2007). They are more aware 
of the possible benefits resulting from IFRS 
application. People from other countries, who have 
international professional experience, are more aware 
of the positive impact of IFRS on the quality of 
accounting. Foreign CEOs are more likely to favour 
world and high quality accounting standards (IFRS) 
than CEOs operating in local markets. Possibly, 
foreign executives from less developed markets, who 
lack broad international experience, do not guarantee 
IFRS application. 
A CEO’s academic degree does not turn out to be 
statistically significant. It seems surprising in light of 
the fact that literatures attribute much significance to 
academic education as a determinant of IFRS 
application (Sucher and Jindrichovska, 2004). It should 
be highlighted that it is not common for CEOs in 
Europe to have academic degrees. CEOs are much 
more interested in obtaining MBA degrees than 
academic titles (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004).  
Our study did not confirm the significant influence 
of gender on IFRS adoption. We found out that in 
companies with male CEOs the extent of IFRS 
adoption was the same as in companies with female 
CEOs. We did not confirm the Musteen et al., (2006) 
and Davis et al. (2010) findings, who discovered higher 
acceptance of change among female CEOs (for 
example IFRS adoption). We suppose that this maybe 
because females performing key accounting functions 
adopt more conservative financial reporting policies. 
This was confirmed with empirical studies conducted 
by Francis et al. (2009) who found that females in key 
positions, responsible for accounting, are more likely 
to present financial results on the basis of conservative 
assessments. This  is especially the case  for CEE 
countries, because local accounting standards in these 
countries are more conservative than IFRS. 
Age was not found to be a statistical significant 
determinant of voluntary IFRS application. CEO 
average age for businesses applying local standards is 
slightly higher. Most CEOs are between the ages 30 
and 70 years. The literature do not explicitly confirm 
correlations between age and choices of financial 
reporting systems. Younger CEOs are inexperienced in 
business but more likely to accept change and risk (for 
example IFRS adoption) (McClelland and O’Brien, 
2011). This is of key importance for relatively small 
entities, which prepare non-consolidated financial 
statements, develop faster, demonstrate higher 
business risk, and need a dynamic and bold leadership 
(McClelland and O’Brien, 2011; McClelland et al., 
2010). It should be noted that a large number of 
empirical studies confirm a negative impact of CEO 
age on the quality of accounting (Srinivasan, 2005; 
Francis et al., 2008). We presume that it is because 
people nearing retirement age are not inclined to take a 
risk and focus on short-term gains, frequently to the 
detriment of long-term profitability and thus the 
probability that older CEOs introduce IFRS will be 
lower. The original enthusiasm, acceptance of risk and 
openness to new trends (IFRS) can be gradually 
replaced: unwillingness to take a risk and accept 
change, and the desire to retain status quo (local 
accounting standards). Experience and expertise 
gained in the process of continuous learning confirm 
the benefits of international standards and lead to IFRS 
application. It might be assumed that middle-aged 
CEOs are more likely to adopt IFRS, while the 
youngest and oldest CEOs are less inclined to apply 
IFRS for the above stated reasons. We suppose that the 
uneven impact of age on IFRS adoption may be due to 
the difference in the labor market (e.g. the level of job 
rotation, wages). For example the longer an employee 
is hired at his/her job, his/her ability to taking extra 
effort at work decreases over time. Rotating the 
employee to a different job may generate a fresh 
impulse for effort. However, job rotation also reduces 
the employee’s time horizon, thus reducing propensity 
to implement long-term projects, like IFRS adoption 
(Hakenes & Katolnik, 2017).   
CEO ownership is not a clear determinant of IFRS 
adoption, either. CEOs in the analysed companies may 
not be fully aware of the numerous benefits of IFRS, 
being discouraged by the high costs and complexity of 
IFRS adoption. Voulgaris et al. (2013) claim that given 
the fair value measurement, IFRS adoption could result 
in the volatility of balance sheet items. Therefore, IFRS 
can hinder measurement of managers’ performance 
according to accounting data. We presume that lack of 
influence of CEO ownership on IFRS adoption maybe 
associated with CEO ownership structure  rather than 
fact the CEO is a shareholder (Banbhan et. al., 2018). 
 
Conclusions 
 
The paper  analyzed the influence of various CEO 
and supervisory board characteristics on voluntary 
IFRS adoption in listed companies preparing 
unconsolidated financial statements from Poland. It 
contributes in identifying the major determinants of 
voluntary IFRS adoption, such as company size and 
international investors presence. We discovered that 
the size of supervisory boards, the presence of 
international members in those boards, and supervisory 
board size have a positive impact on IFRS adoption.  
The influence of CEO’s gender and age, and CEO 
ownership were not found to be statistically significant 
determinants. We conclude that voluntary IFRS 
adoption depends on the characteristics of supervisory 
boards, rather than the individual features of CEOs. 
This should not seem surprising, given a supervisory 
board’s responsibility for corporate governance good 
practices, including the choice of accounting standards. 
The greatest probability of voluntary IFRS adoption is 
conditioned by the co-occurrence of specific variables: 
international investor and CEO nationality; board size 
and international board; board size, international board 
and CEO gender; CEO age and international investor. 
The study contributes to the literature  by shedding 
further light into the new variables determining 
voluntary IFRS adoption in Polish companies. To the 
author’s best knowledge, no previous research papers 
referred to the discussed CEO and supervisory board 
characteristics as drivers of voluntary IFRS adoption. 
All the determinants which can be regarded as the 
international components of corporate governance 
systems (international investor and CEO nationality; 
board size and international board) are verified as 
statistically significant. 
Our findings can be useful for regulators as well as 
various users of financial statements prepared by listed 
companies. The findings are also  significant in the 
context of voluntary IFRS adoption by publicly traded 
companies which do not apply IFRS, or by unlisted 
businesses. This finding adds to the literature, which 
suggests a capital market benefit to mandatory IFRS 
adoption in countries with weak standard enforcement 
infrastructure. We illustrate that IFRS adoption can 
improve the information environment of firms as they 
have the economic incentive to achieve higher levels of 
compliance. 
 
Limitation of the study 
 
The paper did not analyse more variables  due to 
data limitations.  This problem relates mainly to the 
NewConnect market in Poland, created for smaller 
companies, which do not have to meet strict disclosure 
requirements. Future studies could  complement the 
results of voluntary IFRS adoption analysis for East 
European countries by comparing them with those 
focusing on West European companies, including more 
variables such as: presence of independent managers, 
proportion of supervisory board members to 
management board members, and CEO duality. 
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